We study the effects of broker-hosted investor conferences on the informativeness of analyst research. We find analysts' stock recommendations have significantly larger price impacts when the broker has a conference-hosting relationship with the firm. The incremental effect is most pronounced in the quarter following the conference and remains significant for three quarters. The post-conference effect is stronger for small, volatile stocks and when the analyst has more experience covering the firm. Analysts at brokers with a conference-hosting relation also issue more accurate earnings forecasts than non-hosts in the postconference period. Our findings suggest access to management remains an important source of analysts' informational advantage following the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure.
Introduction
A large literature establishes the important informational role that brokerage research analysts play in financial markets. Analysts' earnings forecasts have been documented to be generally more accurate than statistical models (Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Bradshaw et al. 2012) , and another line of research shows that analysts' stock recommendations tend to be profitable (Womack 1996 , Barber et al. 2001 , Jegadeesh et al. 2004 . Although analysts' expertise could arise from skilled processing of public information, a common explanation for analysts' forecasting skill relies on superior access to management. Brokerage analysts place considerable emphasis on interacting with firm management through visits to company headquarters, investor office meetings, and broker-hosted investor conferences. Despite the widespread nature of these costly activities, relatively little is known about the extent to which access to management provides analysts with value-relevant information.
The enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000 requires that management disclose material information to all investors at the same time, which would seem to diminish the value of private meetings with management. Indeed, several studies find evidence that Reg FD largely eliminates the benefits of access to management. For example, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) document that analysts with educational ties to managers issue more informative research than other analysts, but only in the pre-Reg FD period, which suggests value-relevant information may no longer flow along social networks. Chen and Matsumoto (2006) find that analysts providing optimistic recommendations issue more accurate forecasts, but exclusively in the pre-regulation period, suggesting analysts providing favorable research may no longer be rewarded with value-relevant information (see also Gintschel and Markov, 2004) .
On the other hand, existing work on management access relies on relatively noisy proxies based on geographic proximity (Malloy, 2004) , the timing of earnings announcements (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004) , analyst optimism (Chen and Matsumoto, 2006) , or educational ties (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2010) . In this article, we analyze a direct measure of management access using a large sample of broker-hosted investor conferences and examine whether analysts with access to management produce more informative stock recommendations and earnings forecasts.
Broker-hosted investor conferences are organized to provide select investing clients with opportunities to interact with corporate managers, yet the analyst host also may reap informational benefits. The typical conference format includes formal company presentations followed by Q&A sessions, often led by the analyst-host, and series of one-on-one meetings between management and select clients, also often led by the analyst-host (see Bushee, Jung, and Miller, 2011; and Green et al. 2012 for institutional evidence). With other analysts excluded from these private interactions, investor conferences present an ideal opportunity for measuring and evaluating the informational benefits of management access.
We hypothesize that interaction with management at investor conferences provides analysts with an informational advantage that leads to more informative research. Research published immediately following a conference may be particularly informative, and examining contemporaneous research from non-host analysts provides a control for any public information releases. We measure the information content of analyst research as the buy-and-hold abnormal return following stock recommendation changes.
1 Our methodology involves regressing the market reaction to recommendation changes on indicator variables related to the timing and 1 Our emphasis is on recommendation changes since they generally produce larger market reactions than earnings forecast revisions, although we find similar evidence using both measures of analyst research.
source (host or non-host) of the recommendation, as well as various firm, analyst, and broker characteristics to control for factors influencing the informativeness of analyst research (Loh and Stulz, 2010) .
Our analysis of 2,749 investor conferences hosted by 107 brokerages reveals convincing evidence that investor conferences provide their analysts hosts with value-relevant information.
We find analysts at brokerages with a hosting relation with a firm issue more informative recommendations than non-hosts. The results are robust to a variety of controls and hold with analyst and firm fixed effects. Brokerage analysts hosting firms at conferences issue especially informative research in the post-conference period. In particular, recommendation changes in the three months following conferences induce incremental abnormal returns of 30 to 50 basis points depending on the specification estimated. The post-conference effect is particularly strong for small, volatile stocks and when the analyst has more experience covering the firm. We find no evidence that recommendation changes for conference stocks by non-hosts induce incremental abnormal returns during this period, which suggests that only the host obtains value-relevant information during the conference.
The informational benefits of access to management at investor conferences likely decrease over time, and we explore this conjecture by partitioning the post-conference period into six sub-periods. Relative to pre-conference recommendations, intuitively we find that recommendation revisions in the first three months following the conference induce the largest market reaction, yet recommendation changes produce significantly larger market responses for up to nine months following the conference. Moreover, after controlling for known determinants of research informativeness, we find brokers that host a firm at any point during the sample period issue more informative research than non-hosts, which suggests that conference attendance may signal a more general connection to management.
A potential alternative explanation for the market impact findings is that hosts do not obtain value-relevant information on conference days, but that market participants nevertheless perceive their post-conference research to be more informative. We address this concern by also studying the effects of management access on analysts' earnings forecast accuracy. Consistent with the market impact results, we find evidence of increased forecast accuracy for conference hosts but not for other analysts in the post-conference period. Specifically, in the three months following the conference, the hosting analyst issues forecasts that are 8% to 13% more accurate than non-hosts. Together, the improved forecast accuracy and larger market response to recommendation changes in period following investor conferences provides compelling evidence that access to management is an important determinant of analysts' information advantage.
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Although analysts spend significant resources meeting with management, our findings provide some of the first direct evidence that such meetings lead to more informative research, particularly following the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure. Soltes (2012) examines the private interactions between sell-side analysts and the senior management of a single large-cap NYSE firm over a one year period and finds no evidence that private interactions leads to more informed research. In contrast to Soltes (2012), we examine analyst research for over 3000 different companies over a seven year period and find that management access leads to more informative recommendation changes and more accurate earnings forecasts. Our results also 2 We caution against concluding that analysts obtain material nonpublic information at investor conferences in violation of Regulation FD. Analysts may have the ability to produce value-relevant information by piecing together public information and nonmaterial information from management (i.e. the mosaic theory), and Regulation FD allows the transfer of nonmaterial information. While the issue of whether analysts specifically obtain material nonpublic information from management is important, this level of analysis is beyond the scope of the data.
compliment recent work by Bushee, Jung and Miller (2012) , and Soltes and Solomon (2012), who find that institutional investors benefit from private interactions with firm management.
Our findings suggest broker-hosted investor conferences provide a measure of access to management that is more effective than indirect measures based on the timing of earnings announcements (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004) , analyst optimism (Chen and Matsumoto, 2006), or educational ties (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2010) . Moreover, the evidence that analysts at brokers with a hosting relation with a firm issue more informative research prior to conferences suggests conference attendance may proxy for other forms of management access such as company visits or investor office meetings
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the investor conference and analyst research data and presents descriptive statistics; Section 3 examines the effects of investor conferences on the informativeness of analyst research; and Section 4 concludes.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Brokerage Research Reports
Our sample consists of data on brokerage research reports and broker-hosted investor conferences. We obtain data on stock recommendations from the Institutional Broker Estimate (I/B/E/S) Recommendation History dataset. The recommendation history file contains the recommendations of individual analysts with ratings ranging from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (strong sell). We focus on recommendation revisions since prior research finds that recommendation changes are more informative than levels (see e.g. Jegadeesh et al., 2004) . Recommendation changes are computed as the current rating minus the prior rating by the same analyst. Prior research finds that recommendation revisions have a greater impact on stock prices than revisions of earnings forecasts (see e.g. Loh and Stulz (2010)). As a result, our primary focus is on recommendation revisions. Nevertheless, as an additional test, we also examine earnings forecast revisions. We obtain data on individual analyst's earnings forecasts from the (I/B/E/S) Detail History dataset. Forecast revisions are computed as the current forecast for one-year ahead earnings minus the prior forecast by the same analyst. 3 We impose all the same filters that were applied to our recommendation revisions sample. Our initial sample consists of 371,059 forecast revisions. This number is reduced to 171,402 after excluding firm-specific news days, and 168,285 after dropping firms with missing data in CRSP and Compustat.
Broker-Hosted Conferences
We obtain data on broker-hosted investor conferences for the period January 2004 to We merge our revision samples with our conference data by both broker and stock. For each revision we create four conference indicator variables:
 Host: An indicator variable equal to one if the recommendation revision is for a firm that attended an investor conference hosted by the analyst's brokerage house at any point over the sample period.
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 Non-Host: An indicator variable equal to one if the recommendation revision is for a firm that has never attended a conference hosted by the analyst's brokerage house at any point over the sample period.
 Host_Post-Conf: An indicator variable equal to one if the recommendation revision is issued in the 60 trading days following an investor conference, and the report is authored by the conference host. 3 We also examine forecasts of quarterly earnings and find very similar results. 4 We define Host at the broker level rather than the analyst level since the broker's resources are required to host the conference and therefore the hosting relation may not travel with analysts across brokers. We find similar results if we define Host at the analyst level. 5 Table 5 are Host_Post-Conf forecast revisions.
Other Variable Construction and Descriptive Statistics
For each revision, we compute a number of characteristics about the revision, the analyst and brokerage firm making the revision, and the firm for which the revision is being made. In this section we discuss these characteristics and motivate their inclusion as controls. analysts, all-star analysts, analysts with greater firm-specific experience, and analysts working for larger broker houses. 7 They are less likely to be made immediately after an earnings announcement and also more likely to be bold recommendations (i.e. move away from the consensus), on smaller stocks with less analyst coverage.
Panel B of Table 2 presents analogous results for our sample of earnings forecast revisions. Although our forecast revision sample consists of larger stocks with greater analyst coverage (relative to our recommendation revision sample), the patterns across the two samples are very similar. Overall, the findings from Table 2 suggest analysts hosting investor conferences have characteristics associated with more informative research.
Empirical Analyses
Informativeness of Analyst Revisions: Univarite Results
We measure the informativeness of analyst revision (recommendation or forecast) as the stock-price reaction in the two-day event window [0, 1] , where day 0 is the announcement date of the revision. Following Loh and Stulz (2010), we compute the two-day cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return (CAR) for revision i as:
R it is the raw return of stock i on day t and is the return on day t of a benchmark portfolio with the same size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics as the stock. 8 We winsorize CAR i at the 99 th and 1 st percentile for upgrades and downgrades separately.
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We begin by looking at the two-day abnormal returns around recommendation upgrades and downgrades for our four conference variables. The results are presented in Panel A of Figure   1 . Consistent with analysts obtaining value-relevant information at investor conferences, we find that Host_Post-Conf upgrades generate the largest two-day abnormal returns (333 bps), and
Host_Post-Conf downgrades generate the most negative two-day abnormal returns (-319 bps).
We also find that Host upgrades generate larger returns than Non-Host Upgrades (287 bps vs.
185 bps), and we find similar patterns for downgrades. This is consistent with the view that hosting brokers have closer relationship with the firms they invite to conferences and are thus 
Informativeness of Analyst Revisions: Regression Evidence
8 See Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) for a more detailed discussion of the construction of the DGTW benchmark portfolio. 9 Winsorzing helps reduce the impact of extreme 2 day returns that are likely driven by firm-specific news but are not captured by our filters. Nevertheless, our results are qualitatively similar if we use non-winsorized returns.
The results from Figure 1 suggest access to management at investor conferences determines the informativeness of analyst research. In this section, we more formally investigate this idea using a regression framework. Given the largely symmetric patterns for upgrades and downgrades in Figure 1 , we estimate regressions on the full sample of revision (regardless of the direction of the revision) and create a new dependent variable: CAR_IND i equal to CAR i multiplied by an indicator variable equal to 1 (-1) when the revision is an upgrade (downgrade).
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We begin by estimating the panel regression:
Specification 1 of Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of the regression for our sample of recommendation revisions. The results confirm the findings of Figure 1 and also verify that the estimates are highly significant, where statistical significance is computed from standard errors clustered by analyst and firm. To further explore the robustness of our Table 3 Conf is also positive in all specifications and statistically significant in two specifications. PostConf_Diff ranges from 14 to 46 bps and is significant in all specifications except specification six, which suffers from relatively low power. In sum, the forecast revision results yields similar but weaker results than the recommendation changes. The weaker results for forecast revisions is not surprising in light of prior research finding relatively small price reactions to forecast revisions. In light of the generally weak market response to earnings forecast revisions, our remaining tests focus on recommendation revisions.
Event-Time Analysis
The positive and significant coefficient on Host_Post-Conf in Table 3 supports our prediction that recent access to management allows analysts to issue more informative research.
We proxy for recent access to management by identifying cases where analysts meet with management in the prior 60 days, but the benefits of access to management may persist for longer periods. For example, interactions with firms' management may allow analysts to better interpret information released by the company one or two years after the meeting. However, if much of the information is time-sensitive, then the hosting analyst's information will likely decline over time.
We further explore the dynamics of the benefits of access to management by introducing additional indicator variables based on the timing of recommendation changes relative to investor conferences. As before, recommendation revisions are classified as Host_Post-Conf if the issuing analyst works for a broker that hosted the firm at a conference in the past quarter (60 trading days). For clarity in Table 4 bps. This difference falls slightly to 56 and 63 bps for revisions made 2 and 3 quarters after the conference. The informational advantage falls further to 28 bps in the fourth quarter after the conference, 16 bps in the 2nd year after the conference, and 10 bps for revisions made on firms that attended the hosting brokers' conference over two years ago.
14 Specifications 2 through 6, which are analogous to the specifications reported in Table 3 except they now include the additional Post_Conf variables, yield largely similar results. The coefficient on Host_Post-Conf is the largest in the first quarter following the conference, and generally remains statistically significant for three quarters following the conference. Overall, the results are largely consistent with access to management providing analysts an immediate informational advantage that decays over time.
Cross-Sectional Determinants
In this section we examine cross-sectional variation in the informational advantage of the hosting analyst in the period immediately following the conference. More specifically, we estimate the following panel regression:
X i is vector that contains all of the recommendation, analyst, broker, and firm characteristics included as controls in specification 3 of Table 3 . Z i is also a vector of recommendation, analyst, broker, and firm characteristics and is a subset of X i .
We include a number of variable in Z i that we believe may influence the magnitude of more informative when the hosting analyst also makes a concurrent earnings forecast. This is consistent with part of the hosting analyst's information advantage being driven by their ability to better forecast subsequent earnings, a possibility we more formally examine in Section 3.6. We also find that revisions are significantly more informative for smaller stocks and more volatile stocks. Intuitively, access to management is more valuable for harder-to-value firms.
The sample of Host_Post-Conf recommendation changes is relatively small at 1,938. We also consider a longer post-conference period to increase the power of the test. Motivated by the long-horizon results in Table 4 , we redefine Host_Post-Conf to be equal to 1 if the analyst issues a recommendation change for a firm that attended a conference hosted by the analyst's broker during the past 180 trading days (instead of 60). Lengthening the post-conference period increases the number of Host_Post-Conf recommendation changes to 5,173 and generally produces stronger interaction effects. The incremental informativeness of post-conference recommendation changes remain significantly stronger for smaller and more volatile stocks, and the effects become statistically stronger for revisions made around concurrent earnings forecasts.
We also now find that the information advantage is larger for analysts with greater firm-specific experience. As firm-specific experience increases, analysts may obtain better access to management or may better interpret information revealed by management.
Longer-Horizon Returns
Our analysis relies on two-day returns around the release of revisions as a measure of the informativeness of the analysts' research. Such a measure is reasonable if markets are efficient.
However, it is possible that the market incorrectly believes that the hosting analyst has more information and overreacts to revisions released by the hosting analyst. Alternatively, it is possible that market underreacts to the hosting analysts information, in which case two-day returns understate the true benefits of access to management.
If the larger abnormal returns around Host and Host_Post-Conf revisions effects are driven by overreaction we would expect such revisions to exhibit reversals over longer horizons.
To explore this possibility, we re-estimate the equation in results are more consistent with underreaction than overreaction; however it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions given the imprecision in estimating longer-horizon returns. In the next section, we present a more powerful test to preclude the possibility that the higher market reaction to recommendations by conference hosts is driven by overreaction.
Forecast Accuracy
The results from Table 5 suggest that recommendation changes in the post conference period are particularly informative when the hosting analysts also issues an earnings forecast revision. This result is consistent with the view that access to management provides information that allows analysts to better estimate future earnings. We specifically test this conjecture by examining whether analysts issue more accurate earnings estimates for firms that recently attended a conference hosted by their brokers. Such a finding would also provide evidence that the larger market response to post-conference recommendation changes reflects information regarding fundamentals rather than overreaction by market participants.
We estimate forecast accuracy using annual earnings forecasts, although quarterly earnings forecasts generate similar results. If an analyst issues more than one forecast for the firm-year, we use the most recent forecast prior to the earnings announcement date. 16 Following Clement (1999) we measure forecast accuracy as the proportional mean forecast error (PMAFE), which is calculated as:
,, i j t AFE is the absolute forecast error for analyst i's forecast of firm j for year t earnings, and , jt AFE is the mean absolute forecast error for firm j in year t. We demean by firm and year to help control for differences in forecast difficulty that vary by firm-year.
We next estimate the following panel regression:
dHost is the firm-year demeaned value of Host as defined in section 3.2, but modified for earnings estimates. Specifically, Host now equals 1 if the analyst is issuing an earnings estimate for a firm that attended a conferences hosted by the analyst's broker at any point during the 2004-2010 sample period. dHost_Post-Conf and dNon-Host_Post-Conf are defined analogously.
Since all dependent and independent variables are demeaned by firm-year averages, the regression becomes equivalent to a firm-year fixed effects regression. Consequently, the regression is estimated without an intercept.
The results of regression (6) are presented in In specification 3 we add analyst fixed effects to control for differences in innate ability.
The coefficient on Host_Post-Conf remains highly significant. Similarly, the coefficient on PostConf_Diff is largely unchanged at 8.8%, an estimate that is both statistically and economically significant. Overall, the results suggest the access to management at investor conferences allows the hosting analyst to obtain better estimates of future earnings. This finding clarifies the nature of the value-relevant information transmitted, and precludes the alternative explanation that the market incorrectly perceives hosts' research on conference stocks to be more informative.
Conclusion
Broker-hosted investor conferences provide analysts with private opportunities for interactions with firm management. With other market participants excluded from these interactions, brokerage-hosted conferences provide an excellent opportunity for studying whether analysts obtain superior information in periods when they have greater access to management.
We find analysts at brokerages with a hosting relation with a firm issue more informative recommendations changes than non-hosts, and that this difference is the largest in the postconference period. In particular, recommendation revisions in the three months following conferences induce incremental abnormal returns of 30 to 50 basis points depending on the estimated specification.
We consider an alternative explanation for our results, which is that market participants wrongly perceive hosts' post-conference research to be more informative. We find no evidence of return reversal in the months subsequent to the recommendation change. More importantly, we find evidence of increased forecast accuracy for conference hosts but not for other analysts in the post-conference period. These findings support our hypothesis that access to management at investor conferences generates informational advantages for the hosting analyst.
While investor conferences appear to be an important mechanism through which analysts obtain management access, there are many other ways analysts interact with management. For example, analysts routinely take clients to meet management at company headquarters. Analysts also spend significant amount of time communicating with management over the phone and via email. The importance of management access as a source of analysts' information advantage is therefore likely to be greater than what our evidence suggests. Our finding that analysts with a hosting relationship with the firm generally issue more informative research than non-hosts throughout the sample period suggests that investor conferences may serve as a more general proxy for access to management.
Appendix: Description of Control Variables
This appendix describes the construction of a number of variables describing the characteristics of the recommendation revision, earnings forecast revision, or earnings forecast. The characteristics are partitioned into three groups: Revision Characteristics, Analyst and Broker Characteristics, and Firm Characteristics.
Revision Characteristics:
 Host_Post-Conf -a dummy variable equal to one if the revision is for a firm that attended a conference hosted by the analysts' brokerage house over the past 60 trading days.
 Host -a dummy variable equal to one if the revision is for a firm that attended a conference hosted by the analysts' brokerage house at any point over the sample period.
 Non-Host_Post-Conf -a dummy variable equal to one if the revision is for a firms that has never attended a conference hosted by the analysts' brokerage house, but who has attended a conference hosted by a different brokerage house over the past 60 trading days.
 Non-Host -a dummy variable equal to one if the revision is for a firm that has never attended a conference hosted by the analysts' brokerage house.
 Upgrade -a dummy variable equal to one if the revision is favorable (e.g. a recommendation change from hold to buy or an upward revised earnings forecast)
 Abs(Rec Change) -the absolute value of the magnitude of the recommendation change. For example, going from a hold (=3) to a strong buy (=1), would have a value of 2.
 Abs(Revision)/Price -the absolute value of the forecast revision change scaled by the price of the stock two days prior to the revision change. This value is winsorized at the 99%.
 Concurrent Forecast -a dummy variable equal to one if the recommending analyst issued an earnings forecast for the stock in the 3 days surrounding the recommendation [-1,1] and the forecast was in the same direction as the revision.
 Concurrent Recommendation -a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst issuing a forecast revision also issued a recommendation change for the stock in the 3 days surrounding the forecast revision [-1,1] and the recommendation change was in the same direction as the revision.
 Pre-earnings -a dummy variable equal to one if the recommendation (or forecast revision) was issued in the two weeks prior to an earnings announcement  Post-earnings -equals one if the recommendation (or forecast revision) was issued in the two weeks after an earnings announcement [Motivation: Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) .
 Away from Consensus -a dummy variable equal to one if the absolute deviation of the new recommendation (or new earnings forecast) from the consensus is larger than the absolute deviation of the prior recommendation (or prior earnings forecast) from the consensus. If the firm has less than 3 outstanding recommendations (forecast revisions), this value is set equal to 0, and we include an indicator variable (not reported) that equals one when there is a missing value, and zero otherwise  Affiliated Broker = a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst works for a brokerage firm that was a lead underwriter for the firm in an IPO or SEO in the past 3 years. For 2009-2010. affiliation is determined based on data available in 2008.
 Forecast Age -the number of calendar days between the forecast issue date and the earnings announcement date
 Forecast Frequency -the number of forecasts issued by an analyst, for a firm, during the fiscal year.
Analyst and Broker Characteristics:
 All-Star Analyst = a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst is ranked as an AllAmerican (first, second, third, or runner-up teams) in the annual polls in the Institutional Investor magazine in the year prior to the recommendation (or revision) change. For 2009-2010, All-Star is determined based on data available in 2008.
 Past Forecast Accuracy Quintile -Analysts are ranked into quintiles based on their prior one year forecast accuracy in the stock, with quintile 1 being the most accurate and five being the least accurate. If fewer than five analysts are covering the stock, the value is set equal to 0, and we include an indicator variable (not reported) that equals one when there is a missing value, and zero otherwise  Firm Experience -The number of years the analysts has covered the firm minus the average number of years all other analysts have been covering the firm.
 Total Experience -The number of years since the analyst first issued an earnings forecast (for any firm)
 Broker Size -the total number of analysts working at the brokerage firm of the recommending analysts.
 Firms Followed -the total number of firms followed by an analyst in a given year.
Firm Characteristics:
 Book-to-Market -book to market ratio computed as the book value of equity for the year ended before the most recent June 30th, divided by market capitalization on December 31st of the same fiscal year. Negative values are excluded. Positive values are winsorized at the 99%.
 Size -the market capitalization computed as share price times total shares outstanding as of the end of June in the year prior to the recommendation change (in $Millions).
 Turnover -the average daily turnover (i.e. share volume scaled by shares outstanding) over the 63 days prior to the recommendation change.
 Volatility -the standard deviation of daily returns over the 63 days prior to the recommendation change.
 Momentum21 -the stock return over the 21 trading days prior to the recommendation.
 Momentum21_252 -the stock return over the prior 252 trading days prior to the recommendation, excluding the 21 trading days prior to the recommendation.
 Analyst Coverage -the total number of analysts covering the firm in the year of the recommendation change.
 Conference Attendance -the total number of broker-hosted conferences the firm attended during the year of the recommendation change.
Table 1 Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics on recommendation changes and earnings forecast revisions from the I/B/E/S dataset for the period January 2004 to December 2010. Recommendation changes are computed as the current rating minus the prior rating by the same analysts. Analysts initiations or recommendations with no prior outstanding ratings are excluded. Anonymous analysts are also excluded. Forecast revisions are computed as the current forecast for one-year ahead earnings minus the prior forecast by the same analyst. Excluding news drops revisions that occur in the three-day window around the firm's quarterly earnings announcement date, the three-day window around the release of earnings guidance by the firm's management, and days where multiple analysts issued recommendations for the same firm. Non-missing data further excludes revisions for stocks with missing return or volume data over the prior year, as well as firms with negative or missing book-value of equity. The non-missing data sample is partitioned into Non-Host and Host revisions. Non-Host revisions are revisions made by analyst for a firm who has never attended a conference hosted by the analysts' brokerage firm. Host revisions are revisions made by analyst for a firm who has attended a conference hosted by the analysts' brokerage firm. Host_Post-Conf revisions are revisions made by analysts for firms that attended a conference hosted by the analyst's broker over the past 60 trading days. Non-Host_Post-Conf revisions are revisions made by analysts for firms that have never attended a conference hosted by the analyst's broker, but who have attended a conference hosted by a different brokerage firm over the past 60 trading days.
Excluding Table 1 . The 5th column, Post-Conf_Diff, reports the difference between Host_Post-Conf and Non-Host_Post-Conf revisions. The 6th column reports the t-statistic testing whether the difference in column 5 is significantly different from zero. The t-statistic is based on standard errors clustered by analyst and firm. This table reports the results of regressing two-day cumulative abnormal returns following recommendation changes on indicator variables related to the source and timing of report. Cumulative abnormal returns are multiplied by an indicator variable equal to 1 (-1) for recommendation upgrades (downgrades). Host is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the issuing analyst works at a broker that hosted the recommended firm at a conference at some point during the sample period. For conference hosts, the Post-Conference period is categorized (using indicator variables) into Quarter 1 (trading days 1-60 following the conference), Quarter 2 (trading days 61-120), Quarter 3 (days 121-180), Quarter 4 (days 181-240), Year 2 (241-480) and > Year 2 (days >481). Non-Host_Post-Conference,Quarter 1 is an indicator variable equal to one if the recommendation revision is issued in the 60 trading days following an investor conference, and the report is authored by a Non-Host. Specification [2] adds a number of revision, analyst, and broker characteristics, and specification [3] adds firm characteristics (as in Table 3 ). All characteristics are defined in the Appendix. For brevity, the coefficients on the characteristics are not reported. Specification 4 adds analyst fixed effects, specification 5 adds firm-fixed effects, and specification 6 includes both analyst and firm-fixed effects. CAR T _IND i equals the T-day abnormal return around a revision multiplied by an indicator variable which equals 1 (-1) if the revision is an upgrade (downgrade). Returns are winsorized at the 99th and 1st percentiles for upgrades and downgrades, separately. We estimate the regression for four different values of T: 2, 21, 126, and 252. All holding periods compute returns starting on day 0 (the day of the recommendation change) and are held until day T-1. Host, Host_Post-Conf, and Non-Host_Post-Conf are defined as in the appendix. Controls is a vector that contains the recommendation, analyst, broker, and firm characteristics included as controls in specification 3 of Table 3 
